This study examines the interaction between the rules governing presidential elections and multipartism in Latin American political systems. All of the Latin American systems examined here possess presidential systems combined with legislatures which are elected utilizing proportional representation (PR).' I hypothesize that within this framework (Presidential-PR), the rules by which the president is elected have a strong impact on the degree to which the presidential election is a two-party or multi-party contest, the number of effective parties represented in the lower or single house of the national legislature and, by extension, the number of relevant parties operating in the nation. This study focuses on two prominent features of presidential elections : (1) whether the president is elected with a plurality of the vote or whether (at least in the first round) a majority of the popular vote is required for election, and (2) whether the timing of presidential elections is concurrent or nonconcurrent with the election of the nation's lower or single house.
This study examines the interaction between the rules governing presidential elections and multipartism in Latin American political systems. All of the Latin American systems examined here possess presidential systems combined with legislatures which are elected utilizing proportional representation (PR) .' I hypothesize that within this framework (Presidential-PR), the rules by which the president is elected have a strong impact on the degree to which the presidential election is a two-party or multi-party contest, the number of effective parties represented in the lower or single house of the national legislature and, by extension, the number of relevant parties operating in the nation. This study focuses on two prominent features of presidential elections : (1) whether the president is elected with a plurality of the vote or whether (at least in the first round) a majority of the popular vote is required for election, and (2) whether the timing of presidential elections is concurrent or nonconcurrent with the election of the nation's lower or single house. In his work on majority-runoff and plurality formulae Duverger concluded that &dquo;the two ballot majority system tends to produce multipartism&dquo; and that &dquo;the plurality rule tends to produce a two-party system&dquo; (1986: 70 (1945, 1950) were held concurrently, while the latter three elections for the legislature (1954, 1958, 1962) were held separately from the presidential elections. The basic multivariate analysis combines the hypothesis of Duverger (that plurality elections lead to two-party systems while majority systems favor multi-party systems) with Shugart's assertion that presidential elections can have a strong impact on legislative elections in presidential systems. The result is a prediction that, holding other factors constant, systems which utilize the plurality presidential electoral formula will have lower levels of legislative multipartism than will systems that employ the majority formula.14 By extension, and using legislative multipartism as a proxy for the national party system, this choice of presidential election formula is hypothesized to influence the number of effective parties in the nation as well.
As is seen in the OLS regression results presented in Table 4 , the presidential election formula (plurality or majority) does have a very strong impact on the number of effective parties in the legislature, with a t-ratio (2.371, 11-df ) which is significant at less than .05 for a one-tailed test. 15 could be due to their use of nonconcurrent elections. These legislative elections might be used by parties to test their electoral strength, with weaker parties then joining with other (perhaps stronger) parties to support a common candidate in the next presidential contest. Subsequent analysis suggested that such a process did not occur in El Salvador and was only partially present in Chile (where the timing of municipal elections was also important in this regard).
14 A slightly different version of this hypothesis is offered by Shugart and Carey (1992: 224-25) . 15 The possibility of the existence of multicollinearity, especially between the formula and = Table 2 .
Here, the presence of a majority system results in a level of multipartism which is 1.500 times the level of multipartism of a plurality system (holding other factors constant).16 For example, based on this model, in the Dominican Republic (multipartism: 2.46, with a plurality formula and concurrent timing) a 50 percent increase in multipartism from 2.46 to 3.69 would make the Dominican Republic's level of multipartism comparable to that of Guatemala (multipartism: 3.80, majority formula and concurrent timing). This change would amount to an increase of roughly one and one-fourth effective parties in the legislature and to a three-column shift to the right in Table 2. timing variables, was examined. These tests revealed low R-Squares when each independent variable was regressed on all of the other independent variables, with the highest R-Square being .182 (Lewis-Beck 1980: 58-62 (Jones 1993: 66) . The increasing popularity of the Presidential-PR and Premier-Presidential-PR frameworks in Eastern Europe, Africa, and Asia (e.g., Namibia, Poland, Romania, Senegal, Sri Lanka), as well as the Presidential-PR system's continued presence in Latin America, begs for a more complete understanding of the interaction between the rules governing the selection process for the systems' two most important constituent units (the presidency and the lower/single house).21 under the current rules, and it may take time for both voters and party elites to conform to the electoral rules through a learning process; (2) there are many electoral rules (e.g., rules on party formation) which were not examined here but may influence the level of multipartism in specific systems; (3) the small size of the population examined increases the probability of partial outliers exerting a strong influence on the results; and (4) many other factors (e.g., socioeconomic, religious, cultural, regional, ethnic) can also affect the level of multipartism in a nation. 20 The political consequences of the number of legislative parties in an electoral system is an important topic of inquiry. It is, however, beyond the scope of this article. For a discussion of some important consequences, see Lijphart (1984) , Powell (1982) , Remmer (1991) , and Shugart and Carey (1992 
